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implications of each of the two forms of appearance of the experience wholly understood. Classic among such antinomies are those regarding the nature of motion in our environment developed among the ancient Greeks; regarding the innateness of ideas, developed by ways of reaction between Descartes and Locke; regarding the nature of the reality of the matter of our experience, developed by Berkeley and Hume; and the cosmological antinomies of Kant. Besides these particular instances, the antinomy can, however, be found permeating our experience everywhere. Through it is revealed an actual single inner movement and unity, in the universe as it surrounds us, totally different from the cosmic motion of the Copernican system and not recognized in present-day science but which alone will account for such perplexing phenomena as the action of force at a distance. The fixedness of conception, then, as most characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon mind, here invariably leads to confusion and a sense of loss of reality with the passing of the forms present, because the continued presence simply of the fixed forms is taken to be the reality, while philosophical analysis invariably shows that the forms cannot be so retained. The Introduction, from page 82 to 89 of the translation, read in the light of this suggestion, may prove to be of more value, reference being had not only to the fact of flux, but also to the mode of flux, of conceptions.

Furthermore, Hegel in his analyses exhibits a kind of pedagogical ungainliness, which borne in mind will explain and clear up no small part of his obscurity. So the following summary may serve to guide and elucidate. The "Meaning" in the section heading on page 90 of the translation should be understood in the sense of "Supposing;" for this beginning section, subordinated under the general head of Consciousness, is a discussion of the *sinnliche Gewissheit eines gemeinten Dingen*, the sensations or sensuous awareness of a supposed this as apart by itself, over against the knowing, which is the beginning of all conscious knowledge. The next sub-section under the head of Perception (page 104) examines the development and nature of the unities in things, under another aspect also called universals, as essentially forming the basis of our conceptions of the nature of things. The third sub-section under the head of Understanding (page 124) discusses the formation of a continuous scheme of things constituting our conception of the nature of things and consisting of two fundamentally distinct parts or elements, the physical occurrence or fact of experience, and the apprehensive content or metaphysical part in an Aristotelian sense. Following these three sub-sections under the general heading of Self-consciousness (page 163) is shown the mode of appearance of a persisting self possible only through a succession of antinomies or course of antinomic dialectic. The preceding sub-sections show the essential elements in ordinary knowing in their more or less independently distinct character; in this section we have these elements, mutually dependent, forming an indissoluble system. The rest of the work, beginning with a section under the head of Reason (page 220), then shows how out of the movement of successive reactions between the antinomic moments, in a single movement, of a persisting self knowing and an other than the self known, develops the comprehensive structure of science, the conventionalized conscious content of our experience. A closing section under the head of Absolute Knowledge (page 800) then considers various characteristic incidents of the independent absolute form attained in our experience by the foregoing mode of analysis.

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*De l'origine et de la nature mnemoniques des tendances affectives.* Par E. RIGNANO. Estratto da "Scientia": Rivista di Scienza. Vol. 9. Anno 5 (1911). N. XVII. 1. Traduit par le Prof. J. Dubois. 35 p.

In this article the author outlines a genetic theory of the affective states. The term affective is restricted to the special category of organic tendencies

which manifest themselves subjectively in man as desires, appetites or needs, and which objectively, in both man and animals, are translated into non-mechanized movements. Admitting this definition, the author reduces the entire series of the principal affective tendencies to the single fundamental tendency of the organism toward its own physiological state of equilibrium. This tendency may be observed in all unicellular organisms, *e. g.*, hunger which is the most fundamental affective state is reducible to a tendency to maintain or re-establish in the nutritive internal *milieu* the qualitative and quantitative conditions which permit a stationary metabolic state. This tendency toward a state of metabolic equilibrium has become, in the course of phyletic evolution, a tendency to accomplish all the acts necessary to procure food. The hydra and sea anemone, for example, react positively to food only if the metabolism is in such a state as to require more material. The localization of hunger in the higher animals is a secondary development, and merely one of the multiple aspects of the part functioning vicariously for the whole which characterizes all the physiological mnemonic processes. It is the same with thirst, which though localized in the glands of the throat, is a need of the entire organism. Similarly, the need of elimination of substances produced by general metabolism, which the organism is not able to utilize, whether in the simplest infusoria or the most complicated vertebrate, follows the same general rule. In this category of affective eliminative tendencies, the author places the sex instinct. To this fundamental property that every organism possesses, *i. e.*, the tendency to conserve the equilibrium of its own normal physiological state or to re-establish it if it has been disturbed, must be added another which in its turn becomes the source of new affectivities. When the original state cannot be re-established then the organism tends to pass into a new static condition adapted to the new external or internal *milieu*. In this way, the whole series of the phenomena of adaptation is produced. The experiments of Dallinger and others on the acclimation of lower organisms have shown conclusively that this secondary state once established tends to perpetuate itself. This tendency is of a purely mnemonic nature and implies for the different elementary physiological states, forming altogether the general physiological state, the faculty of leaving behind a specific accumulation or mnemonic residue susceptible to revival or recall. The extension of this faculty of specific accumulation to all physiological phenomena in general is in harmony with the hypothesis which posits nervous energy as the basis of all vital phenomena.

With the extension of this mnemonic faculty to all the elementary physiological processes, we arrive at a somatic or visceral theory of fundamental affective tendencies. Naturally in organisms endowed with a nervous system there would gradually be developed along with the affective tendencies whose origin is purely somatic, the tendency, sometimes co-operative and sometimes vicarious, "represented by the corresponding mnemonic accumulations, deposited in that special zone of the nervous system which is directly connected with respective points of the body." In man, this zone would be the *Körperfühlsphäre* of Flechsig, to which is added in certain cases the frontal zone. These mnemonic cerebral accumulations once established under direct somatic action are able, even after communication with the body has been severed, to represent the original affective tendency in which they originated, *e. g.*, Sherrington's "spinal" dog showed the same repugnance to dog flesh in precisely the same way as a normal dog. Finally affective tendencies owe their subjectivity to their mnemonic, physiological origin, from the fact that the organism finds itself endowed with specific affective tendencies in accordance with the particular environmental history of the species or individual. In support of the foregoing hypothesis thus briefly sketched, the author cites various examples from the higher animals and man, *e. g.*, he finds the origin of maternal love in

the principle of elimination, the need of being nursed. Homesickness is due to the disturbance of fixed paths of habituation. As a further confirmation of the hypothesis of the mnemonic nature of the affective tendencies Ribot's principle of *transfert* is utilized.

In accordance with this principle, in itself of mnemonic origin, all affectivities not directly traceable to a mnemonic source are derived from those which are thus referable, and are therefore of indirect mnemonic origin, *e. g.*, secondary sex affectivities, cruelty as an end in itself, derived from the original tendency of tearing prey to satisfy hunger, the desire of victory for itself, originally self defence, the desire of amassing wealth, which is a transfer from the original simple impulse to satisfy hunger plus the intellectual element of foreseeing its recurrence.

Emotions according to this theory "are only sudden and intensive modes of putting in action those accumulated energies, which constitute precisely the affective tendencies." Emotions and affective tendencies are distinguished from each other by the fact that the same affective tendency may, under different circumstances, give rise to very diverse emotions; to emotions of different intensities or even, in some cases, to no emotion at all in the proper sense of the word, *e. g.*, the affective tendency of a dog for his piece of meat may be translated, according to circumstances, into flight, anger, or merely a search for a quiet place in which to enjoy it. As all affective tendencies result in movement, external or internal, the theory is here in accord with that of Ribot and the Lange-James theory.

The will is only an affective tendency inhibiting or impelling to action like every other affective tendency. As to pleasure and pain, the theory is in accord with that which interprets pleasure as the subjective accompaniment of unimpeded activity and pain as due to its inhibition.

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*A Text Book of Psychology.* E. B. TITCHENER. Macmillan Company, New York, 1910. pp. xx + 565.

Professor Titchener in the present volume has given us more than a text-book of psychology. The book comes fairly close to being a brief, systematic psychology—an earnest, certainly, of what the author will give us when his more complete study is ready. At the present time, in English, we have at our disposal many elementary texts on psychology, and many elementary laboratory manuals; but we are poverty-stricken for advanced works in general, systematic psychology (based step by step on experiment), and for advanced experimental manuals on the various sense-fields,—attention, association, etc. Titchener's book, while supposed to be for elementary students, is far from being an easy text. Indeed, the author's own way of thinking has become so much more complex since the writing of the *Outline* that I doubt if he himself clearly realizes just how much of his more recondite reflections have become incorporated in the book. If I were seeking a quarrel with the Text-book I should find the grounds for it on the score of too great complexity. It is a little heavy for the average junior or senior. But psychological classes differ greatly in the different institutions. In some, psychology is required; in others, elective. In some the "quarter" system is in vogue, and only one quarter is allotted to psychology; in others, psychology runs the year through. It is doubtful whether Titchener's book can be adapted to meet the requirements of a short course. In institutions where the elective system is in operation, and where a full year can be given to psychology, I know of no text better to use than the one under discussion. In view of the fact that the author introduces experiments everywhere and that he discusses methods and results the book lends itself easily both to systematic and to experimental presentation. Any student going carefully over the work with a competent instructor will come out at the end of the year with an increased respect for psychology and with the